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Abstract
This paper discusses some of the main characteristics of modernism and
its influence on science and in particular theology. Descartes7approach to
reason, "I think; therefore I am," and the Newtonian mechanism
(mathematical principles of Natural Philosophy) prepared the way for
deifying reason duringthe Enlightenment. Modernism became the foundation
on which the so-called "scientific paradigm" was built. "Scientists" were
regarded as people who could produce exact and unambiguous results. This
paradigm framed our intellectual, social, and theological thoughts and
influenced scholars to become paternalisticand imperialistic, servingexclusive
goals and propagating reductionistic truths. A new paradigm has developed
which has adopted a postobjectivistic and postpositivistic position. It is
regarded as systemic and is characterized by a functional and a teleological
interrelatedness, as well as an interdependence of dynamic entities
incorporating a whole. Postmodern scientists regard themselves as
"participants" instead of "spectators." A network of relationships is
important, engaging all people and the whole person. This paper addresses
how scholars, within this new paradigm, can become more like "wise"
servants and less like masters of absolute, cognitive, and exclusive knowledge.

Introduction: Post-modern or Postmodernism?
Progressively more scholars believe that we are living in a post-modern
age and that our traditional modernistic way of undemanding this world is
coming to an end.' Murphy states that a dramatic change in " t h i h n g
'Stephen Edelston Toulmin, i%e Return to Cosmology: Postmodem Science and the
Theology of Nature (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982),254; William E. Doll, A
Post-modemPerspective on Cuwiculum (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993),3. Stanley
Grenz says that we experience a cultural shift that challenges the change frompremodemity
to modernity (A Primer on Postmodernism [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 19961, 2). P. Cilliers
states that a postmodern condition is not merely the result of willful acts by theorists, but
is due to the complexities of the linguistic and social spaces ("Postmodern Knowledge and
Complexity," Suzd-Affikaanse Tydskrifvir Wysbegeerte 14, no. 3 [1995]: 126).

strategy" has occurred among Anglo-Americanintellectualsduringthe last half
of the century. This can be described as a "paradigm" shift that has important
implicationsfor theology, in particular for conservative theologians that insist
on God's special action in the world, as well as for the authority of the Bible.*
If these statements are regarded as valid, it will challenge us, as scholars, with
difficult, but also with creative and even radical, new opportunities.
The title of this paper: "Beyond Modernism: Scholarship and
n.~
'Servanthood,'" indicates a serious effort to move beyond r n ~ d ~ s rBy
designating the title of this paper "Beyond Modernism," I indicate that I
wish to differentiate between modernity and m ~ d e r n i s mThe
. ~ concept of
modernism represents a positivistic approach that is characterized by,
inter a&, rationalism, empiricism, reductionism, and mechanism.
Modernism means to make modernity into an absolute and final state of
affairs. In view of the fact that my own vision is still being tinged by the
modern worldview, I have not designated this paper as "beyond
modernity" but rather "beyond modernism." By designating my position
as "beyond modernism," I actually present a "post-modern" (witha
hyphen to distinguish it) approach. Post-modernity should not, however,
be equated with the concept of the postmodernism which changes postmodernity into an absolute and final notion.' My "post-modern" position
could rather be placed within constructive post-modern thought than
within deconstructivepostmodernism.' This post-modern vision looks to
'J. Wesley Robbins, "Murphy on Postmodernity, Science and Religion," Zygon 33
(Summer 1998): 463-466.

'For a critique on modernism, see R. A. Morrow and C.A. Rorres, Social Theory and
Education: A Critique of Theories of Social and Cultural Reproduction (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1995), 409.

'I am still bound to use the tools of modernity; I do not, however, wish to
accommodate a "late modern" position. For a critique on late modernism see E. van Niekerk,
"Postmodern Theology," in Faith, Theology and Post-modernity: Package 2 (Pretoria:
University of South Africa, 1995), 1-21.
5P.M. Rosenau states that post-modernistscome in many shapes and sizes-upbeat postmodernists, despairing post-modernists and post-modernists who do not appreciate being
called post-modernists.Whereas postmodernism is stimulating and fascinating, it finds itself
at the same time on the brink of confusion ("Affirmativesand Sceptics," in The Truth about
the Truth: De-confusing and Re-constructing the Postmodern World, ed. Walter Truett
Anderson [New York: Putnam, 19951, 107). Van Niekerk states that although the term
"postmodernism"has been used to describemany social tendencies and experiences,there are
some recurring themes in the post-modern debate. Some of these are contingency,
randomness, lateral networking versus hierarchical oppositions, multifacetedness, and a
protest against progress (van Niekerk, 1).
6J.Wentzel van Huyssteen states that Rosenau tentatively distinguishes between two
streams of thought in the current post-modern debate: affirmative and skeptical
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the past, and it transcends it in such a way that the new is built on the old.
It will both accommodate and "stretch" the past and modernity. I have
thus chosen to speak of a "post-modern" vision rather than of a "model"
or even of an "approach."
This paper will emphasize two important issues. First, a post-modern
vision wishes to overcome the "conservative-liberal" discourse with its
search for absolute and objective truths. Second, it will demonstrate that
scholarship and "servanthood' can be more easily accommodated within
a post-modern vision than within modernism.

From Prernodernism to Modernism
Premodernity looks at things in an organicway.' God was regarded as the
center of the world and also of our understanding. Premodernity, however,
was progressively replaced, to a large extent, by a positivistic view of science.
While Plato and Aristotle separated ideas from objects, they at least still
believed that these notions needed each other. Their thoughts nevertheless
anticipated the foundation of modern positivistic science.' Scientists such as
Copernicus (1473-1543), Kepler (1571-l63O), and in particular Galileo (15641642) closed the door of premodernity and opened the door to a new
worldview. They insisted that the world has to be interpreted from a strictly
quantitative point of view.9
This position was strengthened by the ideas of Descartes (1596-1650).In
postmodernity. On the one hand, skeptical postmodernism offers a pessimistic, negative,
gloomy assessment, with a vagueness or even an absence of moral parameters. Affirmative
postmodernists, on the other hand, have a more hopeful and optimistic view of the postmodern age. This affirmativekind of postmodernity is open to responsible normative choices
("Should We Be Trying So Hard to be Post-modern? A Response to Drees, Haught, and
Yeager," Zygon 32 [December 19971: 571). See also W. T. Anderson, "Four Different Ways
to be Absolutely Right," in The Truth about the Truth, ed. Walter Truett Anderson (New
York: Putnam's Sons, 1995), 112,113. Anderson places scholars such as Richard Rorty and
Thomas Kuhn within a constructivist worldview. He designates the second group as those
who are "post-modern players." Their position is more "an attitude" than an "intellectual
position." The third group is that of the nihilists, who believe that since not all the
conflicting beliefs can be true, they must all be false.

'5. Degenaar maintains that the premodern k o u r s e is characterized by the absence of a
so-called critical approach. The premodern k o u r s e is structured by the language of the
community to which one belongs ("The Collapse of Unity, in N m Models of Thinking on the
Eve ofa N m Century, ed. C. W. du Toit [Pretoria: University of South Africa Press, 1996],6).
'Ibid., 20. Quantifying results became the central technique of the emerging positive
scientific enterprise. Galileo believed that God used the alphabet of mathematics to write the
laws of nature.

his Discourse on Method he established the foundations of knowledge by
presenting his beliefs vis-a-visradical doubt. The certainty that remains in
confronting doubt is that the thinking subject is doubting. Therefore the
certainty of knowledge rests in the fact that the thinking self is the " f i
truth" that doubt cannot deny, namely, I think; thert$ore l a m (Cogzto ogo
sum). He argues, "I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of
philosophy."10This led to a new conception of the human person. Humans
are "thinking substances" and "autonomous rational beings."ll Dgcartes,
"rightly conducting reason for seeking truth," had faith in mental reflection,
and an external order that is expressed in a manner that we can understand
and accumulate accurateempirical observations.This enclosed a naive idealism
in human abilities and in the one-to-one relationship between what we think
reality is and reality itself.'* Descartes' four methodological rules for directing
reason searching for truth made it clear that there is no dynamic relationship
between fact and theory, practicality, and imagination. Whatever is true or
For Dexartes
factual is not "created" by the human mind but "dis~overed."'~
there was not only an external reality that was set up by a rational,
"geometricaln God, but this reality was unaffected by our personal activities
and prejudices. He even went further and separated reality into primary and
secondary qualities. The primary qualities are those of position, size, shape,
and motion, and they are objective and mathematical in nature.14 The
secondary qualities are "things" such as color, odor, taste, texture, and sound,
are less real and inferior to the primary. Personal feelings and intuitions are
thus not a source of knowledge. Dexartes' subject-objectdualism made nature
and "thingsn "objects" to be manipulated by "reason."15
For the next three hundred
philosophers and theologiansaccepted
'?Rent5 Descartes, Philosophical Works, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross
(New York: Dover, 1955), 106.
"Ignace de la Potterie, "History and Truth," in Problems and Perspectives of
Fundumental 7%eology, ed. Rent5 Latourelle and Gerald O'Collins, trans. Matthew J.
O'Connell (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 89.
12Red Descartes stated: "[There are] certain laws which God has so established in
nature . . . that after sufficient reflection we cannot doubt that they are exactly observed in
all which exists or which happens in the worldn (Discourse on Method: Meditations on First
Philosophy Principles of Philosophy [London: Dent, 1950],27).
"Doll, 30-3 1.
"De la Potterie, 89. For Descartes mathematical truth is the model of all truth. He
limited the object of metaphysics to distinct and clear ideas. The objects of research must
have the proofs of arithmetic and geometry.
15Grenzstates that the modern person "can appropriately be characterized as Descartes'
autonomous, rational substance encountering Newton's mechanistic worldn (3).
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the primacy of reason advocated by Descartes. His view that the truths of
mathematics arise from the nature of reason itself and that they are more
certain than knowledge which is derived from empirical observation paved
the way for the ideal of "rationality" and "objective kn~wledge."'~
Newtonian mechanics led to the rejection of the organic
view." Here
reality was reduced to basic mechanical elements: Every particle was "what it
[was] apart from the other." These particles were regarded as autonomous
units that together formed a machine. They were touching each other in a
machine-like way, but they did not affect the inner nature of each other.18
Armed with this "atomistic" model, modern science and technology attained
great triumphs. From Newton's Principia Mathematics it was clear that the
universe had a simple symmetry. Within this symmetry was a set of linear,
causative relations accessible to exact mathematical description. The "natural"
order of Newton's universe was both simple and observable.19
Both Descartes and Newton sought to use the power of reason to
enhance a theological agenda. People started to speak about this world
from a quantitative approach rather than a qualitative approach.
Rationalism became the accepted norm and replaced revelation and the

perspective offaith."
Modernistic Science
Descartes' reasoning, "I think; therefore I am," Newton's mechanistic
worldview (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosopby), the further
developments during the Enlightenment, and the "success" of scientific
research resulted in an unqualified confidence in scientific inquiry and the
deification of specifically technical rationality. "Science" became a dogma
instead of remaining just another discipline. It mastered the art of
16Doll,113,140.Pierre Laplace, Henri de Saint-Simon,and Auguste Comte had a vision
of a new age-industrial and technocratic.Progress did not only seem possible it was regarded
as inevitable. Philosophy and positivistic science had created their own rules in the game of
knowledge and allowed only rationalistic knowledge, which consists of definitions.
"Newton best constructed his concept of new cosmology in the final edition of his
Phifosophiuenaturalisprincipiumathemdtica (Cambridge,MA :Harvard University Press, 1972).
"David Bohm, "Postmodern Scienceand a Postmodern World," in TheReenchantment
of Science: Postmodern Proposals, ed. David Ray Griffin (Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1988), 60-62.
'?Doll, 27. Philosophers such as Voltaire, who took Newtonian mechanics to France,
proclaimed this science to be the "messiah" of the world. Doll maintains that the "dismissal
of God as a working hypothesis, which Laplace did so easily, was but the final stop in the
march from organicism to mechanism, from inherent essences to mathematical formulae."

"control" so well that it was "mushrooming its methods into a metaphysic"
and thus creating "~cientism."~~
Modern thought very soon adopted a
mechanistic, atomistic, and positivistic perspective; this adoration of science
led to its deification that reached its heyday
Scientists
- in the early 1960~.~'
were regarded as people who could produce exact and unambiguous
knowledge.
These developments were also influential in giving rise to the so-called
"exact" sciences. These scientists assumed that they were dealing with "facts"
and "objective" data. These so-called "exact" sciences also introduced
themselves, to a large extent, as the ultimate solution. In the year that
Charles Darwin published his Ongin of Species, Herbert Spencer asked and
answered the question: What kind of knowledge is worth the most? His
reply was "~cience."~'
Science, and in particular positivistic science, became
the foundation on which was built the modernist paradigm framed our
intellectual, social, and theological thought. Reason was bound by and
defined in terms of scientific technology." This modernist paradigm
introduced an understanding of a social, psychological, and physical
environment in which not only a positivistic science developed but also a
generation
of scientists who claimed absolute truths from an exclusive
stance.25This modernistic approach determined our worldview, cognitive,
methodology, and the nature of scholarship. Theology developed a
methodology that accommodated the criteria of these "exact" sciences.

UModernscienceaccepted an epistemologyand a methodology that were reductionistic.
Psychology, and in particular Freud and many of his colleagues,proclaimed that human beings
were determined by their biological composition. Classical Behaviorism regarded humans as
determinedby their social context, whereasMamism believedthat human beings were merely
the product of their labor. Empiricism and the correspondmce view of truth led modern
science to believe that truth can be determined in an absolute and comprehensiveway. The
theory of evolution was constructed and empowered by modernism's worldview. Modern
science with its "successful" and persuasive technological development, empowered
evolution: "Our world is progressively becoming better."
"Herbert Spencer states: "for gaining a livelihood . . . Science, for parental functions . . .
Science, for good citizenship . . . Science, for the enjoyment of art . . . Science, for the purpose
of discipline . . . Science. Science . . . is the best preparation for all these orders of activityn
(Education:Intellectual, Moral, and Physical [London: Williams & Norgate, 1929],84-85).
24Dollmaintains that "science of this Spencerian type-a modernist adaptation of Rene
Descartes' rationalism and Isaac Newton's empiricism-has become for the social sciences,
and hence for education and curriculum, a paradigm" (1).
25Cilliersmaintains that positivistic science shifted from verification to falsification,"Ifone
cannot add to the grid, you could at least disquahfy unwanted members." He concludes that
everythingthat was too complex or containedunpredictabilitywas disregarded. "Subsequently,
large parts of the totality of human knowledge are &regarded as unscientificn (128).
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Theology became obsessed with finding exactly the right method and the
irrefutable modern rational argument.
David Tracy, however, states that "we are all, willingly or unwillingly,
being forced to leave m ~ d e r n i t y . " ~ ~

Rationalism
Modernism may, in thefirst instance, be "characterizednby rationalism.
Rationalism determined, to a large extent, the "naturen of theology and its
reductionistic approachto truth?7The enlightenment project was built on the
epistemological assumption that the modern "mind" can obtain certain and
absolute knowledge. It is believed that the discovery of more knowledge is
always good and that progress in science will set us free from bondage.28
After Descartes' knowledge was regarded as a separate and isolated
notion, removed from the experiences and wisdom of life,29truth became
more and more defined with concepts, and revelation and faith were
explained by way of proposition^.'^
Whereas truth was at fxst separated from history,31it later became, for
26Theabove mentioned approach is being progressively challenged by scholars, such as
Tracy, who states that we are all, willingly or unwillingly, being forced to leave modernity.
David Tracy, "The Return of God in Contemporary Theology," in Why Theology? ed.
Claude Geffri and Werner Jeanrond (London: SCM Press), 37.
27WalterTruett Anderson argues that there are at least four distinguishable worldviews,
each with its own language of public dscourse and epistemology: (1) the postmodern-ironist,
who believesthat truth is sociallyconstructed;(2) the scientificrational, who findstruth through
methodical and disciplinedinquiry; (3)the social traditional rationalist,who maintainsthat truth
is found in the heritage of the Western world; and (4) the neoromantic,who findstruth by being
in harmony with nature and/or spiritual discovery of the inner self. Anderson maintains that
the scientific-rational and the social-tradtional approaches are conservative worldviews that are
holding on to the values of a modern world that is "beginning to look kind of shaky" ("Four
Different Ways to be Absolutely Right," in The Truth about the Truth, 110-111).

29Dela Potterie further states that "Platonic idealism, with its strong metaphysical
structure and its keen sense of transcendence of God, could not survive as such in the modern
age that is so profoundly rationalistic and positivistic" (89).
jOIbid.,90. De la Potterie notes that this was particularly noticeable in the way theologians
spoke of truth. "Whereas Scripture and the older tradition always used aletheiu or
in the
singular and meant by the term the definite revelation Jesus has made, nineteenth-cennuy
theology became increasingly accustomed to using the word in the plural and speaking of the
truths of faith; such a practice meant a risk of absolutizing in formulasthe revelation of God in
Jesus Christ. The language used becomes abstract: 'Ineffable truths proposed by . . . divine
revelation.'"
"There is, however, something in common between the views of Plato and the
Enlightenment, as they both isolate truth from history. De la Potterie says that "the result

the modern mind, that which "passed the test of scimt$c veriication or [was]
guaranteed by solid historical do~umentation."~~
According to the
presuppositions of this approach, truth is found solely by scientific and
historical research, and it cannot be found by faith?' Pure rational truth alone
started to dominate the "confused and uncertain material of sense
e~~erience."~'
Researchers shifted their emphasis from making "good
judgments" to making "accurate
The Western world was
characterized as a "triumph of the mind," the Cartesian mind. Thomas H.
Groome maintains that this was a narrow epistemology in that it "demeaned
the function of memory and imagination in knowing, and excluded the
corporeal, the affective, the aesthetic, and the relati~nal."~~
Scholars' desire "to know" became degraded to a rabid quest for rational
certainty and institutionalized reason." This quest for certainty was, however,
mostly in the realm of zdeas and not in the sphere of ethics or behavior.38
is, that here again, but in a quite different sense than in Platonism, Christ, whose divinity is
now denied, ' . . . is radically cut off from history with its contingency and servitudes. He
comes on the scene as a superman who brings truth that is valid at all times and outside of
time. . . . Time and history are in principle completely neutral and irrelevant and set no
conditions truth is universal'" (ibid., 90).
j21bid. Historical truth became the only truth. Only facts that have been documented
and controlled by all can be scientific and guarantee the objectivity of history. This
understanding paved the way for critical-historical methods to give the real picture of the
biblical text. De La Potterie states that these methods can discover only the external aspect
of Christ's person; they are unaware of the mystery of his life and thus of his truth.
331bid.,94-97. De la Potterie states that truth later became an existential experience
under the influence of Max Stirner and Saren Kierkegaard.
341bid., 89. According to de la Potterie, a similar position was held by Leibniz.
Knowledge of truth has nothing to do with common experience.Pure reason deals only with
truths independent of the senses. Philosophical presuppositions like this prepared the way
for Lessing's axiom at the time of the Enlightenment:"Accidentaltruths of history can never
become the proof of necessary truths of reason."

36ThomasH. Groome maintains that the "enlightenment rationality, with its battle cry
of 'dare to think' (Kant), has been turned against itself with a vengeance. So much of the
critical literature of the post-Enlightenmentera has been a devastatingcritique of its episternic
paradigm-especially of its naive rationalism, exclusivity, individualism, feigned objectivity,
and lack of recognition of its own politics and social interest" ("Religious Knowing: Still
Looking for That Tree," Religzous Education 92 [1997]: 207,208).
"John D. Caputo asksthe question:"Do we not require both?"referringto rational certainty
and an openness to other aspects of life. He concludes that we need an undecidable fluctuation
between institutional and noninstitutional reasoning (Radiurl Hermeneutics: Rtpetition,
Derons~ruction,and the HermeneuticProject @3loomington:Indiana University Press, 1984,229).
"Ferdinand E. Deist states that "African" thinking does not give "priority to the idea,

"Common-sense" wisdom was disrmssed, and the only knowledge regarded as
valid was "scientificnknowledge.39John D. Caputo statesthat to a great extent
reason soon came to mean a kind of logic that supports systems of power
which are currently in place, whereas irrationality becomes that which is
without power." Kant's "pure reason" and the "autonomy of reason" thus
need to be regarded as a dangerous abstraction, "for reason is always already
embedded in systems of power."41
According to Ernst M. Conradie, "post-reformed" theology
progressively emphasized the cognitive element of faith." With such an
emphasison knowledge in theology, theology becomes lmowledgeabautGod
and not knowledge of God. Scripture is regarded as a compilation of eternal
and rationalistic truths about God in the Newtonian mechanistic sense of the
word. Within thls approach theology is assigned the task of formulatingtruths
in an absolutely meticulous and accurate way. This, however, is often done
within an ahistorial context. Theology then falls prey to intellectualism,
losing its dynamic moment as a contemporary event.
A post-modern vision questions the rationalistic reading of the Bible that
assumed that the texts of the Bible were provided by a pure valuefree
rationalism. Rationalism enables us, for example, to
either a low
view or a high view of Scripture. It does not, in a reflexive way, take serious
cognizance that our view of Scripture is predetermined by our
presuppositions. ?%us our view of Scripture is, without any interrogation,
regarded as the biblical view of Scripture. With the assistanceof some or other
rationalistic and mechanistic tools we eliminate all the "noises." A postmodern vision sees a rationalistic reading of the Bible as a reductionistic
reading that deprives the Bible of its dynamic story of God's salvation and
liberation." Thus rationalism reduces the Bible to an "object."
but to action, not to theory but to practice. Thus an idea cannot be right or wrong in
principle or in abstracto.It can only be judged once the idea has materialized in a deed, and
the deed can only be called right if its outcome is beneficialn("South-AfricanisingBiblical
Studies: An Epistemological and Hermeneutical Inquiry," Scriptura 37 [I9911 : 38).
39Seealso Petrus Secundus Dreyer, "Die fdosofie van Imrnanuel Kant en Protestantsteologiese Denkstrukture," H m r m d e Teologiese Studies 46 (1990): 589, 592. According to
Dreyer, Kant stated that miracles have to be explainablein a rational way; otherwisethey cannot
be accepted as miracles. He says that Kant changed the Christian religion into a rationalistic
philosophical system.
T a p u t o states that "it is of the essence of the power which institutionalised reason
exerts that it is able to define what is out of power as 'irrational'" (229).

42ErnstM. Conradie, "Modelle van teologie as handeling," Scriptura 36 (1990): 15.
4'In the light of van Peursen's statement that "the most important change in recent

Our senses can no longer be divided in an atomistic way. Modernistic
scholars often divorce the will from feelings, thinking that Christian people
should be "rational" people. Reason alone cannot guide value judgments in an
adequate way. Jeff Astley says reason is blind in this area.44Reason divorced
from emotions is no longer human and thus no longer reasonable." Whereas
we need to "reasonnabout our emotions, reason cannot and must not replace
affective and conative modes. Rationality has to be related to cultural, social,
and psychological contexts. If it is not, one's own reductionistic context will
determine the nature of one's scholarship. Rationality cannot merely consist
in intellectual and cognitive consistency, nor be the "fact finding instrument"
that David Hume took it to be.

A Searchfor Objectivity and Absolute Truth

A second important aspect of modernism, and in particular rationalism,
is its search for absolute and objective truths.&Descartes' Cogito ergo sum set
philosophy is that 'Rationality' does not function any more as an absolute standard," one may
assumethat there are no absolute or final rationalisticstandards accordmgto which the Bible can
be read. See C. A. van Peursen, ^Ratio and imaginatio," South Afican Journal of Philosophy 10,
no. 3 : 64. It is not, however, suggested that theology can employ an esoteric method. The
concept "esoteric" means a method that employs statements of faith that cannot be questioned
and further discussed in a theological debate. Thielicke cites: "Die nova oboedentia gibt der
Vernuft die Freiheit gegenuberden unwissendvon ihr getragenenDiktaturen."SeeJohan Andre
Wolfaardt, Kerklike konfiontasie oorde (Groningen: VRB Offsetdrukkerij, 1971), 63.
44

Jeff Astley argues that sometimes we are at our most Christian "when we do love 'too
well,' against all reason and 'despite the evidence.'" Astley concludes that "despite the risk
we run of having emotions, including the risk of these emotions being or becoming
irrational, we would not be human without them" (The Philosophy of Christian Religzous
Education [Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 19941,228).
451bid.,232. Astley argues that we should reject the personification of "Reason" as an
opponent to "Feeling." They are both aspects of our motives.
V a n Niekerk argues that "from the medieval period until the 17"h century the main
experientialideas of subiectum and obiectum went through an interesting process. Subiectum
in that period had to be understood as the topical object of a person's 'thinking and action'
and should not be seen as a passive object in the modern sense of the word. . . . Later the
notion of an object became the standard designation for subiectum." ("Inaugural Lecture,"
14). Grenz argues that the Enlightenment project had the assumption that the modern
"mind" can determineknowledge in a certain and objectiveway (4). Tutorial Letter 103/1988
(Biblical Studies, BSA 302-3) :32, 34, states that fundamentalists "maintain that there is such
a thing as 'objective truth' and that it is possible to establish it." According to this letter, one
of the founders of fundamentalism was Charles H. Hodge, who argued that there is a great
distinction between theories and facts. Theories are human constructions and subjective.
Facts are of divine origin and thus objective. There is, thus, a clear "distinction between
objective and subjective knowledge." The latter is associated with "theories, feelings,
experience,practical or superficialknowledge; objective knowledge, on the other hand, rests
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a process in motion that created an "objective" world." Richard Rorty
maintains that the Western culture has centered itself around this notion of
the search for truth and the desire for objectivity. He argues that this tradition
ran from the Greek philosophers through the Enlightenment. It has, however,
turned away from solidarity to objectivity." With the emerging of the view
of the "mind-asinner-space," science was distracted from the search for
wisdom to the quest for knowledge or rationality seen in terms of a correct
representation.49Tracy describes this modernist view of science as follows: It
"found its apex in the positivistic view of science: here, objective, true
scientific knowledge is grounded in empirical facts that are uninterpreted,
indubitable, and fixed in meaning theories derived from these facts by
induction or deduction are accepted or rejected solely on their ability to
survive objective experimentation; finally, science progresses by the gradual
accumulation of facts."50
Scholars demanding "objectivity" in their research can be associated with
a generalized method used in the natural sciences. Van Niekerk states that the
British philosopher Alfred Ayer, in Lungmge, Truth and Logic, adopted this
method: To be scientific meant conformingto the natural sciences.Judged by
this criterion, ethics and theology are emotive theories and not scientific.
Modernistic scientists saw themselves as researchers who produced exact and
unambiguous knowledge, and established absolute truths. The absolute
abstraction and reduction of human nature is an example of this kind of
reasoning and an important characterization of m~dernism.~'
Post-modern scholars maintain that the highest ideal for modernistic
academics, namely to be objective, is created by default. Being influenced
by the Cartesian understanding of objectivity, they have confused this soon facts, proof, logic and reason." See also A Megill, ed., Rethinking Objectivity (Durham,
'NC: Duke University Press). This collection presents two kinds of attacks on the old
meaning of objectivity: (1) Objectivity has been used and is being used as a cover by the
powerful, who are imposing their interest on others; (2) objectivity needs to be redefined in
terms of intersubjectivity.
"Van Niekerk, "Inaugural Lecture," 5.
48Ri~hardRorty,
"Solidarity or Objectivity," in From Modernism to Postmodemism,ed.
Lawrence E. Cahoone (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 573-588.
49J. G. Allen, "Rationality, Relativism, and Rorty," Sud-Afikuunse Tydskrif vir
Wysbegeerte 11, no. 3 (1992): 53.

%avid Tracey, cited in Van Huyssteen, 569.
51Modernismdescribed the "absolute subject" as one who "thinks therefore he is";
"produces therefore she is"; "I have a certain gender"; or "I have a certain pigmentation,"
therefore I am. In this regard see van Niekerk, "Postmodern Theology," 5.

called objectivity with relative consensus about matters.52This is done not
only by supplying so-called proofs from the Bible or from "suitable"
empirical research, but also by what Jacques Derrida would designate as
"logocentrism."53Scholarstry to bypass the figurative "nature" of language
and are "longing for presence," hoping to find a privileged position
outside language. This will ensure them a position of fixed meanings and
a view of reason as a universal norm of understanding."

C o n s m t i v e and Liberal Presuppositions:An Objective
And Absolute Reading of the Biblical Text?
Both "confessional" (conservative) and "liberal" scholars, sailing in the
same modernistic boat, are seeking for an objective reading of the biblical
rexP by adhering to the modernistic communication paradigm, which at
times makes "religious dialogue . . . often little more than a contest to
demonstrate 'We're right.'"" Tracy maintains that when there is a
problem of correlating theos and logos, theology becomes obsessed with
finding exactly the "right method" and the "irrefutable modern rational
argument" for understanding and even perhaps for controlling God.'
Confessional scholars, on the one hand, often protest against any
information that does not suit their starus quo; on the other hand, they are in
accordance with the basic points of departure of the modernistic paradigm.
Fundamentalists, with an irrationalrationality and an ad hoc incorporation of
a metaphysics of understanding the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the verbal
52Rortystates that "such institutional backups for beliefs take the form of bureaucrats
and policemen, not of 'rules of language' and 'criteria of rationality'" (579).
'See J. Degenaar, "Deconstruction-The Celebration of Language," in TheReader and
Beyond, ed. B. Lategan (Pretoria: HSRC Press, 1992), 196.

55Rortymaintains that "we are the heirs of thls objectivist tradition, which centers
around the assumption that we must step outside our community long enough to examine
it in the light of something which transcends it, namely, that which it has in common with
every other actual and possible human community" (574-575).Van Niekerk states: "Modern
literary criticism, historical criticism and fundamentalist reading of 'sacred' texts like the
Bible all sail in the same boat" ("Postmodern Theology," 8). See also Nancey Murphy,
"Postmodern Non-relativism: Imre Lakatos, Theo Meyering, and Alasdair MacIntyre," The
Philosophical Forum 27, no. 1 (1995): 30. However, before the reader objects to this
categorizing of modernistictheologians, I hasten to point out that whereas many modernistic
scholars can be characterized by these positions, others have reacted against them, but in
ways that share many of the presuppositions of their modernistic times.
%C.Mechert, "Pluralistic Education in a Postmodern World," Religious Education 90
(1995): 346.
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inspiration of the Bible, and with such tools as the grammatical-historical
method, or the dicta probantiu method, believe that the Bibleper se supplies
them with "proofs" and absolute "biblical" statements.
"Liberalnscholars, on the other hand, most often accommodate the
so-called scientific approach and use "scientific"too1s and positivistic
methods, such as the historical-critical method to interpret the Scriptures
and to determine what the Bible "really says.n58
A post-modern vision takes serious cognizance of Jiirgen Habermas'
point of view that all knowledge is motivated and mediated by "human
intere~ts."'~
Even the knowledge of the natural sciences reflects the interests
and voices that are controlled by the production of such knowledge.60
According to Habermas, the statement "Science has proven," which is
expected to end all argument, should be answered by the question, "From
whose perspective and to serve what interest?*' "Scientific explanations and
concepts are provisional human constructsorganizingthe natural world; they
are not independent of human intellectual capacities, social interactions, and
contingencies of history."6ZPost-modernists believe that many of the
problems of communication with people and the biblical text come because
of the lack of a reflexive approach in theology and thus a failure to take
serious cognizance of the role of our "worldviews" and presuppositions.63
58EdgarV. McKnight states that "the historical-critical 'reduction' of the text is fully
satisfying within a world-view which sees meaning in terms of a temporal origin and
historical cause-and-effect" ("Can We Make Sense in the Aftermath of Reception Theory?"
in TheReader and Beyond: Theoryand Practicein SouthA h n ReceptionStudies, ed. Bernard
C. Lategan (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), 269).
'?For a discussion of Habermas's views on objectivity, see M. Hesse, "Science and
Objectivity," in Habermus: Critical Debates, ed. J. B. Thompson and D. Held, 98-115.

Wall, 60. According to Doll the holocasut of two world wars has shattered the sweet
dreams of reason for a more just and moral society.
"Van Niekerk says that Habermas, in Erkenntnis und Interresse, identified three
knowledgeproducing interests: "(i) An interest in control, associated with a positivist selfunderstanding of the sciences and with the world of work; (ii) an interest in understanding,
associated with the hermeneutical sciences and cultural processes; (iii) and an interest in
emancipation,associated with the criticalsciences and progressivesocialevolution" (Xritical
Theory in the 2 0 Centuryn
~
(1996],4). See also Groome, 209: "Though there can be an
emanicipatory interest to our knowing, and much of Habermas' work is about makingsuch
interest intentional and self reflective, yet the technical and social sciences are driven by the
interest of production, control, and maintenance of the status quo."

@WillemB. Drees, "Naturalisms and Religion," Zygon 32 (1996): 526.
63AlbertWolters, "Dutch Neo-Calvinism: Worldview, Philosophyand Rationality," in
Rationality in the Chlvinian tradition, ed. Hendrik Hart, Johan van der Hoeven, and
Nicholas Wolterstorff (Lanham, MD:University Press of America, 1983), 115. See also
Ferdinand Deist, "Bybelinterpretasie en ideologiekritiek: 'n Hermeneutiese oefening,"

Challenging absolute and objective points of view, does not assume
that there are no "absolutes," as some postmodernists believe, but does
challenge pretentious scholars maintaining a "God's eye view."64 No
human or "tool" can abstract the contents of the Bible in pure form." To
let the Bible as interpreted by us be a most important pointer to God's
Word, God's Action, or God's Love, scholars need to be servants of this
Word, this Action, this Story and this Love, acknowledging that their
individual understanding of "realitynandthe Bible's message is "pictured"
in terms of their own thought categories.' Not only by interpreting or
reinterpreting the Bible do scholars disturb its "content," but by the mere
act of "observing" the Bible and putting it in a specific context, they
disturb its ~ontent.~'
By assuming that they read the Bible in an absolute
objective way, scholars are not uplifting but rather minimizing, to say the
least, the message of the Bible." The post-modernist view contends that
traditional individualistic "objectivistic" epistemology "ignores the
intentionality and expressivity of human action and the entire complex
process of intersubjective negotiation of meanings. In short, it disguises as
TheologiaEvangelica 15, no. 2 (1982): 8,lO. Modernisticscholars need to be confronted with
Deist's statement, that this approach of surrendering all presuppositions to the text of the
Bible cannot be taken. We cannot make any observation if we do not have a frame of
reference. Mannheim's statement is thus important: It is not only my enemies' knowledge
that tends to be ideological-but all knowledge is socially (and I may add, also culturally)
determined and hence ideologically tinged.

65TutorialLetter 103/1988 :63, reads that the grammatical-historicalexegetical method
reflected the influence of Scottish Common Sense Realism (see also Mark Ellingsen,
"Common Sense Realism: The Cutting Edge of Evangelical Identity," Dialog 24 (1985) :199200). For Reid, who developed Common Sense Realism, objective, nonperspectival
observationof a phenomenon is possible. He statesthat the Scottish Common SenseRealism
can be described in relation to three main emphases: (1) Epistemological Common
Sense-this is the idea that our perceptions reveal the world very much as it is, (2) Ethical
Common Sense, and (3) Methodological Common Sense. The problem that confronts this
method is that the "historical" or doctrinal element often determines the meaning of a word.

"Ibid., 35. Deist states: "The mere act of reading the Bible thus disturbs the Bible itself.
Therefore there cannot be something like the eternal, unchanging and certain message of the
Bible. To statethe message of the Bible means to have conceptualised it first. Conceptualising
implies a process of conception (from the father [the Bible] and a mother [the readerD which
leads to the birth of a third 'personality,' different from the father and the mother."
68MartinWeber illustrates something of the predicament of the conservative churches.
Modernistic scholars believe that there is only one correct position (Who's Got the Truth?
Making Sense out of Five Dtferent Adventist Gospels [Silver Spring, MD: Home Study
International Press, 19943.
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given a world which has to be continually intqreted.""
Binary Oppositions Dictate the
"Reading" of the Biblical T a t
Whereas opposing distinctions are not modern inventions,
modernism reduced the possibility of differentiation by constructing
closed binary oppositions.70Western theological tradition became very
much constructed on a polar or dyadic foundation: "Christian theology
is repeatedly inscribed in binary terms."" Modernism does not regard
these opposites as equal. These binary oppositions represent a firmly
hierarchical two-tier structure, "with one of them-the surface-securely
on top, and its deep counterpart as surely in place as the real foundation
of what is expressed on the ~urface."'~In this regard the "husk-kernel" or
"form-content" opposition does not only demonstrate such a search for
an objectivistic and a universalistic content of the Bible, but it may also
represent a paternalistic attitude.') The danger is that in a very subtle way
scholars may become imperialistic dictators." Scholars, particularly those
from a position of power, always designate and dictate the "core" of the
message, whereas others may decide on the "form" and the "husk."" This
69G.M. Esland, "Teaching and Learning as the Organization of Knowledge," in
Knowledge and Control, ed. M.F.D. Young (tondon: Collier-Macrnillan, 1971), 75.

70VanNiekerk, "Postmodern Theology," 6.
71Mark C. Taylor, "Erring: A Postmodern A/theologyYnin From Modernism to
Postmodernism: An Anthology, ed. Lawrence E. Cahoone (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell
Publishers, 1996), 516.
72VanNiekerk states that this modern "two-tier philosophicalscheme also functions as
the hyphenated inside-outside of human beings and things (mainly since Descartes)."
According to Van Niekerk, postmodernity "seriously questions the modern hierarchical
relationship, in which the 'surface' of thought or perception is causally linked with the
'depth, meta-, foundational or basic' dimension. In the postmodern differentiationspectrum
the modern binary dialecticof essence (depth) and appearance (surface) becomes two or more
adjacent surfaces." He concludes: " Should we not scrutinize in each case the constructed
experientialcontinuum that articulates the oppositionalpoints or limiting values of modern
societies and accordingly defer any attempt to master the continuum from either structural
term?" ("Postmodern Theology," 2).
"Van Niekerk argues that one of modernism's tools is the reduction of things to one
basic explanatory "essence" ("Postmodern Theology," 1).
74VanNiekerk arguesthat the modernisticbinary oppositions brought forth a reduaionktic
prioritisation of two opposing values as
tendency, which in turn brought forth the "valwsmit~1
the b a l l and end-all of any episodic ontologyn(Tostmodern Theology," 34).
75Whereassome conservative scholars want to force even their cultural forms onto
other cultures, others speak of the adoption of "biblical absolutesn into culture. They are

approach can be taken to indicate that the 'core" represents a "pure
gospel," which does not really have any implications for the shape of
social or cultural life. Max L. Stackhouse came to the conclusion that this
division obscures the fact that "various versions of the 'pure gospel' are
more contextually influenced than their advocates recognize." He notes
how critics of ethnocentrism, sexism, racism, and colonialism as seen in
Christianity have often pointed out that what has been propagated in the
name of the "pure gospel" seems to correspond to the prejudices of the
time, gender, race, and geographical and social location of those who
spoke in such spirited terms about the 'pure gospel."76

A N m Approch to Science and 7heoZog-y
In philosophy, literature, natural sciences, quantum physics, and
recently in theology, new voices are being heard. A paradigm has
developedthat has adopted a postobjectivistic and postpositivisticposition
and which demands a new approach to metaphysics, epistemology, and
cosmology." Science, in particular quantum physics, has moved beyond
Newtonian mechanics and atomism, Cartesian rationalism, and the
subject-objectbifurcation." Descartes' subject-objectdichotomy has been
aware of the temptation to proclaun the message in another culture without clothing it in
the cultural garb of the people. They still believe, however, that there are biblical absolutes
for all cultures and ages and that these must be proclaimed. Essential truths are being
demarcated by using the kernel and husk (or content and form) approach. Even some more
progressive theologians seem to adopt this approach: The church is being warned to
distinguish between form and essence, shadow, and substance. Without denying that there
may be such biblical absolutes, I would contend that we have not yet fully determined what
these absolutes are. From within a different culture we may question these absolutes. Are
they absolutes in Western clothing? Should other cultures also have the right to discuss the
absoluteness of these biblical absolutes?
7 6 M a ~L. Stackhouse, "Contsrmalization and Theological Education," Theologzcal
h k a t i o n 23 (1986): 71-72. Stackhouse contends that, since the E-tenment,
many attempts
have been made to identify the "essencen of Christianity and to distinguish this from "the
'accidents' of social, cultural, linguistic, and historical context." According to Stackhouse, this
kernel and husk,(or content and form) approach suggeststhat there is an ecumenical, orthodox,
and context-invariant core to the Christian faith. This core has the potential to enter "into,
refine, affirm, and give normative g;llldanceto a l l sortsof 'accidental' contexts aroundthe globe."
Stackhouse concludes that these distinctions are too sharp.
nDoll states that the linear, sequential, and easily quantifiable ordering system that
dominates educationtoday is giving way to a more complex system of network that is more
pluralistic in nature (3).

*J. Mouton, A. G. van Aarde, and W. S. Vorster, Paradigms and Progress in neology
(Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council,1988), 226. Lines said: "The classical science
worldview was mechanistic in analogy, reductionistic in method, disciplinary in research,

replaced by a subject-subject networking approach, and atomism by an
interrelatedness of things.79
Postmodernism has, in spite of its new forms of reductionism, opened
up some important issues that cannot be too easily ignored by theology.
Instead of rationality, the importanceof language and its deconstructionhas
been introduced." The seeking of knowledge and the search for so-called
truth do not exclude the politics of power. Instead of seeking "objective"
truths, post-modernists are challenged to cooperate in constructing, in an
episodic way, dynamic intersubjective moments of faith.

From Atomism to Wholism and Networking81
Newtonian mechanics introduced an atomistic worldview. Toulmin
states, "from the time of the Renaissance on . . . the chief intellectual
instrument-and virtue-of scientific work was, precisely, its singleminded preoccupation with the specific, narrowly defined questions
proper to particular scientific disciplines."'* This modernistic
reductionism has, particularly, given a privileged position to the mind.
In contrast with modernism, post-modernity has a thirst for a renewal
of the sense of the whole.83Humans "know" the world to some extent, but
deterministicin outlook, static in perception, entropic in direction, dualistic in practice, and
positivistic in determination of truth." According to the theory of relativity,the Newtonian
instruments of measure, such as mass and length, are relative to a particular observer. They
may be altered by one's frame of reference and are thus not absolutely quantifiable. Nancey
Murphy states that whereas modernism was characterized by a foundationahm in
epistemology, referentialism in philosophy, and atomism in metaphysics, postmodern
philosophy is characterized by wholism, a use of language instead of reference and
antireductionism("Postmodern Non-relativism:Imre Lakatos, Theo Meyering, and Alasdair
MacIntyre," 7%ePhilosophical Forum 27 no. 1 (1995), 38-40).
79Doll,29. Newton believed that individual atoms form the ultimate "building blocksn
of nature. These autonomous units touch each other in a mechanistic way, but each operates
independently.
?For a ddferentiated critique on postmodernism see J. D. Caputo, Against Ethics:
Contributions to a Poetics of Obligations with Constant R.ference to Deconstruction
(Bloornington: Indiana University Press, 1993).
"Networking aspires to make progress beyond a holistic approach. Although certain
properties are not denied by networking, it rather emphasizes the so-called "lines-of-flight,"
crisscrossingthe properties. See in this regard D.P. Goosen, "Interdisciplinary Studies: An
Apology for Nomadism," lecture given at the meeting of the Faculty of Theology and
Science of Religion, 30 August, 1995,l.

"Ted Peters, "David Bohm, Postmodernism, and the Divine," Zygon 20 (1985): 193.
According to Peters, Bohm's thirst for wholeness is founded upon the reason that in the

they know it through feelings and mrivings, as well as through sense
impressions and thinking. This would mean that the scholar consists of the
whole human being "where the cognitive, volitional and affective intera~t."'~
The affective, cognitive, aesthetic, the personal and social, the spiritual and the
ethcal, human corporeality and sexuality, memory, and imagination, yes,
every aspect should be valued as a source of knowing and wisdom.
these lines, P. Cilliers argues that the self needs to be understood from the
perspective of a "'fabric' of relations, a node in a network." We are not
atomistic units standing for ourselves or by ourselves; neither can we throw
away everything that does not fit into our reductionistic scheme.85
The network of relationships is important to the post-modernist for at
least two reasons: First, scholars should take note, in a reflexive way, of all
exclusions and the overabundance of "oppressions at work in the
production of knowledge" and should without constraint be committed to
real "democracy in the production of knowledge."" The "subject" (scholar,
researcher) does not manipulate the "object," but the community of
knowers and searchers are marked by conversation, dialogue, and reflexive
thinking. Instead of an "objective-subjective"position, post-modernistsurge
a relational position. "The relational aspect is not only among the knowers
but also between the knower and the known. Instead of the subject standng
'over against' to 'master' the object by knowing it through non-engaged
objectivity, there needs to be a relationship between them that brings both
knower and known to question each other."l" Second, post-modernists
contend that scholars cannot be engaged in theological thinking in isolation,
analyzing something objectively. Whole people, not only from every
nation, tribe, and language, but also from every discipline and status, need
to communicate and reflect in a reflexive way.
In this regard, Habermas, with his "ideal speech situation," argues that
our community and "life-world" have been overwhelmed by the "steering
media" of money and power.88Technical rationality (Zweckrational)must
world of Newton and Descartesthere is a fragmentation, a void of wholistic thinking. Grenz
states that postmodernity's emphasis on holism is related to the rejection of the assumption
of the Enlightenment, namely, that truth is certain and purely rational. It refuses to limit
truth to its rational dimension (7).

of CommunicativeAction, with its more than 800 pages
"Jiirgen Habermas's The&ry
of serious philosophical reading, has made a sigdcant contribution toward the theory of
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be counterposed to practical rationality (reaching understanding) and
emancipatory rationality (self-reflection and emancipation from
oppression by systems). Communicative action must be differentiated
from technological rationality, from the types of social action and
nonsocial action that are oriented to "success" and to the achievement of
ends and goals. For Habermas, understanding (Vmtiindigungjis to bring
about an agreement (Einverstiindnis) that leads to a reciprocal
understanding, shared knowledge, and mutual trust. The ultimate
objective of this is to come to an understanding with another person.89
Scholars can no longer be entangled by a monological perspective of the
philosophy of the subject. Rather, post-modernists view the speaker and
hearer as participating in a mutual reciprocal relationship, with
communicative action being intrinsically dialogical. Habermas thus
wanted to overcome the bifurcation between sender and receiver.
Rationality is not achieved from a transcendental perspective, but is
practically constituted by ~ e o p l eengaged in communication free from
constraint and coercion. To resolve a breakdown in communication, one
moves to a level of discourse and argumentation where they, through the
"force of the better argument, reach a consen~us."~
A conversation that
can be regarded as "unlimited" is designated by Habermas as an ideal
speech situation in which people are, in principle, able to participate
communication (2 vols., trans. Thomas McCarthy [Boston: Beacon, 19841987l. Habermas
argues that the Edghtenment project, and in particular the idea of universal morality and
critical reason, has provided important gains. We cannot abandon them, but need to dedicate
ourselves to a "radical enlightenment." The enlightenment is incomplete, but not "dead."
Mumby believes that in Habermas the modernist project is once again linked with an
emancipatorylogic (D.K. Mumby, "Modernism, Postmodernism,and Communication Studies:
A Rereading of an OngoingDebate," CommunicationTheory7 [199q: 10).Strausscontendsthat
the freedom of intellectual emancipation needs to be extended to all spheres of life. Modernity
has colonized the lifeworld by the system and has thus failed to radicalizethe emancipation of
the Enlightenment.Through his critiqueof the Cartesian legacy and the reconstruction of social
theory, Habermas developed a linguistic model of communicativeunderstanding. Habermas's
philosophy culminates ultimately in his analyses of communicative action (D.F.M. Strauss, "'n
Wysgerige perspektief op die twintigste eeu teen die agtergrond van die voorafgaande
eeuwendinge," Tyakkrilvir Chtelike Wetenskap30 [I9941:12).Werstehenist kommunikative
Erfahrung" for Habermas (Jiirgen Habermas, Erkenntnis and Interesse Frankfurt: Suhrkamp
Verlag, 19701, 227). He believes that his theory of communicative action can win back the
control of the "lifeworld." Terrence W. Tilley, "Toward a Theology of the Practice of
Communicative Action," in Postmodma Theologies: 7$e Challenge of Religious D i m i t y , ed.
Terrence W. Tilley (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1995), 9.
89Fora critique of consensus see N. Rescher, Pluralism: Against the Demand for
Consensus (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).

V. Duvenage, "Die kritiese teorie as 'n filosofiese perspektief op die twintigste eeu,"
Tydskrifvir Christelike Wetenskap 30 (1994) : 49.

without d~mination.~'
In resolving disputes, even the better argument
must be open to a rational debate. One can conclude that Habermas is
defending a strong "cognitivist" position. His "ideal speech situation,"
however, may be, at the most, regarded as a late modern approach still
following the "conduit metaphor." This conduit metaphor eliminates all
"noisesn-and regards
them as disturbances that distort communication
between person and person or between text and person.92
From a neopragmatist perspective, Rorty argues that foundationalism
conceptions of rationality destroy con~ersation.~'According to him,
foundationalism imposes restrictions on reason and forces it to an end."
The notion of contingency is important as it sustains and encourages
conversation. Conversation is characterized by an absence of issues, such
as fixed goals, lists of acceptable topics, hierarchies of membership. In our
conversation different "universes" of communication meet. The plurality
of voices and the practices they represent need to be protected against all
attempts of "closure."95 Foundationalism seriously inhibits such a
conversation and thus retards thought, "which is always set in motion by
the encounter with strangeness."96 A serious problem is Rorty's refusal
to introduce any external values and criteria within this discourse.
Modern discourse, according to Jean-Francois Lyotard, has made itself
legitimate by appealing to a coherent metanarrative that performed a
general unifying function. Postmodernism rather wishes to introduce a
multiplicity of discourses and many "language games." They are not
externally legitimate but rather locally justified. Lyotard argues for
smaller and more numerous stories that function well within their own
contexts. In this regard Cilliers accuses, by implication, conservative

"Van Niekerk states that Habermas's conduit metaphor is a "sealed communicative
pipeline from person to person or a multiplicity of individual pipelines between this person
and the next one." According to the conduit metaphor of reading, a text must have the "least
intrusions, distortions, interferences and misprints to 'prove' that it is the purest and thus the
correct interpretation." This conduit metaphor is still based on the Claude Shannon
information theory ("Postmodern Theology," 8,9).

"M. Peters, "Techno-science, Rationality, and the University: Lyotard on the
'Postmodern Condition,'" Educutional Theory 39 (1989): 97,99. According to Peters, Rorty
argues for a position termed "epistemologicalbehaviorism." It explains what society allows
us to say, rather than what we say.
"Allen, 54.

96SeeRichard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1980), 9; Allen, 54.
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theologies, which have developed a nostalgia for grand metanarratives that
unify. This is a dream of Western metaphysics that experiences the
postmodern condition as fragmented, characterized by anarchy, and thus
meaningless. This is not a relativizingof knowledge, not an "anything-goes"
sit~ation.~'
Lyotard's "connectionist" model is not based on Newtonian
atomism, but the self is understood in terms of a "fabric of relationships,"
a "node in a network." Everyone is always involved through a network of
relations with others, this has importance for and influence on the total
cGscourse.
Modernistic discourses, and even some postmodernistic discourses,
focus onesidedly on communication as a rational and logical discourse. A
post-modern vision seeks both to communicate (rationally) and to have
believing, affecting, and imagining aspects which encounter each other's
stories as well as God's Story.

The Post-modern Scientist: A Partict@anP8
R. Sassower claims that modern scientists have viewed themselves as
"spectators," whereas post-modern scientists regard themselves as
"participants" in the study of this world.%From the year 1600 onward
science and philosophy pursued "'rational objectivity' of a kind that could
Thus for Pierre
be arrived at only by a detached and reflective observer."'@'
Simon, Marquis de Laplace, the scientist must observe, analyze, describe,
and comment on phenomena ("objects!") without being drawn into them.
The human mind must observe the world, but always from outside. This
encouraged a particular psychological attitude, the investigation of
specialized science from a detached viewpoint. It has been "natural" for
the scientist to work from a psychological distance. In describing the
modernistic scientist, Toulmin states, "Too much emotional involvement
with his subject matter will not do the investigator's scientific work good:

98Grenzstates: "In rejecting the modern assumption of the objectivity of knowledge
postmoderns also reject the Enlightenment ideal of the dispassionate, autonomous knower.
. . . The postmodern worldview operates with a community-basedunderstanding of truth"
(8). Rorty maintains that Plato developed the idea of the intellectual, who is one, and is in
touch in an immediate way with the nature of things. This produces the idea that rational
inquiryshould "makevisible arealmto which non-intellectualshave little access"("Solidarity
or Objectivity,"574).

991. Sassower, "Postmodernism and Philosophy of Science. A Critical Engagement,"
Philosophy of the Sociul Sciences 23 (1993): 434.

warm hearts rarely go with cool heads."lO' This called for a second kind
of abstraction. Just as the different disciplines were studied in abstraction
from one another, so too, the modernistic scientist needed to approach his
or her problem with a "cool" intellectual spirit. If the problem cannot be
studied in abstraction from all interests and personal concerns,
modernists fear that research may be clouded and biased by other,
nonscientific preoccupations. Toulmin concludes that modernistic
disciplinary abstraction within the "sciences has brought in its train, also,
a certain personal abstraction within the minds of working scientists."lo2
New scientific developments in the twentieth century reject any
assumption that scientists have to adopt a fully detached attitude.
Scientists can no longer be spectators: The "scientist as spectator is dead.
. . . Laplace's ideal of the Omniscient Calculator has failed us, even in the
purest and most fundamental parts of physics." Toulmin states that to
insist on subordinating "human" disciplines to the methodology of
modernism is to make "the rational objectivity of the intellectual
spectator into an idol."lo3Within the new paradigm scientists become
agents and servants rather than merely critical observers.lMA post-modern
theology cannot separate practical and theoretical issues, so-called facts
and values, cognition and action. The distinction between experts and
"lay" persons cannot be seen in terms of a hierarchically-structured
opposition. It needs to be differentiated on a continuum in terms of more
or fewer "readings" of a text. The only difference between a lay and an
expert reader of a text is, then, that the expert reader may have more
arrangementsof different tools and signs of the text than the 1ayperson.lo5
A post-modern approach should thus be far more cautious about its
"study-room-scientific" theories. C. W. du Toit's statement, that people's
wisdom is a far safer guide than our scientific theories, should be a
challenge to scholars in the new millennium to be far better "listeners" to
and co-searchers of wisdom.lo6

'04Toulmin states that "farfrom being free to sit in the stands and watch the action with
official detachment, like the original theori at the classical Greek games, scientists today find
themselves down in the dust of the arena, deeply involved in the actual proceedings"(252).

lo5Van
Niekerk, "PostmodernTheology," 12,13.
lo6C.
W.du Toit, Navorsing a waurheid?Aanpassingsin die sistematiese teologze in die
lig van veranderde kontekste (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 1995), 4.
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Wisdom as Tmth Rather B a n
Cognitive and Objective Tnrths
Rorty states that Western culture and tradition focus on the notion
of the search for truth. This is the clearest example of where one is
turning away from solidarity to objectivity in order to make sense of
one's existence. The idea of "truth as something to be pursued for its own
sake, not because it will be good for oneself, or for one's real or imaginary
community, is the central theme of this tradition."lo7 In conservative
denominations the unshakable belief in truth, even truth as cognitive
truth per se, stands out. Most often this search for truth is based on a
positivistic approach: These truths can be "provedn either by empirical
research or by biblical texts.'"* It is also assumed that these "truths" will
protect against relativism.lo9
More and more scholars believe that much of our knowledge has not
been "for good" but "for evil" and is inclined to be dehumanizing. They
regard the dominant epistemology of the West as violent, elitist, and
exclusive. It is naive about its own context, and follows a technical
rationality without sound ethical norms; it is exclusive and privatized and
is "working hand-in-glovewith o w worst oppressions and most repressive
Many scholars have constructed their theologies to a large
extent on the possibility of an "absolute truth.""' This has to a large
107Rorty,"Solidarity or Objectivity," 574.
'08Fundamentalistabsolutism stems from the Philosophy of Scottish Common Sense
Realism. The Bible is seen as a reservoir of facts that can afford us with an objective
perspective on the world (Tutorial Letter 103/1988,42).
'OSAstleysays that we must distinguish between the debate about relativism and the issues
of relativity. The philosophers of the Enlightenment appealed to an abstracted and culture-free
notion of rationality (257).Runzo distinguishesbetween different types of relativistic theses. He
defines "relativism" as "any epistemologicalposition which holds or entails that the correctness
or incorrectnessof judgement about matters of truth or value varies with which individual, or
set of individuals . . . is making judgements." Runzo describes this position as. cognitive
relativism, making a distinctionwithin cognitive relativism between "socidlydefinedconceptual
relativism and an individualisticsubjectivism."He also distinguishesbetween cognitiverelativism
and epistemologicalrelativism, and between cognitive relativism and value relativism. Astley also
discusses the objections to relativism, inter aliu, the "self-stultdying" argument-relativism
destroyingitself. The everyday criticism against relativismis that it leadsto skepticism and moral
anarchy and can result in absurd claims (Reason,Relativism and God [New York: St. Martin's
Press, 19861).

"'Scholars within the modem paradigm cannot help fallingprey to the search for objective
truths. From my perspective, Ellen G. White does not put the same emphasis on truth as
absolute objective truth. She speaks of "God's truth," "eternal truth," "Bible truth," "sacred
truth," "the truth as it is in Jesus," "present truth," etc. She does not, however, seem to state that

extent become a search for cognitive and dogmatic truth. This "truth" is
not only determined by rationalism, instrumentalism, and mechanism;
but it is also often emptied of love, integrity, commitment, and solidarity.
The twentieth century has witnessed the triumph and decline of the
notion of truth defined by a mechanistic and reductionistic worldview.
Even the natural sciences, the so-called exact disciplines, are now regarded
as relative projects, influenced to a large extent by social ideologies and
attitudes.l12 According to du Toit, we cannot construct theological
pointers without seeking "truth." These cannot, however, be absolute
"truths," but only "important truths." Rorty does not argue that there is
no such thing as truth, but proposes that we should drop the idea of truth
as somewhere out there waiting to be discovered. He states: "It is to say
that our purposes would be served best by ceasing to see truth as a deep
matter, as a topic of philosophical interest, or 'true' as a term which
repays 'analysis.'"113E. McKnight urges us to speak of "truthfulness*
rather than truth. He points that we no longer arrive at a "truth" over
against us, but at "truth which touches us."'" Truth demands
t r ~ t h f u l n e s sTruth
. ~ ~ ~ is not a metaphysical phenomenon; it is influenced
by time, culture, tradition, language, and society.l16
truth is final, absolute, and mechanistic, nor that it cannot further open up its rich and dynamic
dimensions to us. Truth, then, is certainly not cognitive knowledge. In the Advent Reviere,and
Sabbath Herald she states: "The disciples were put in close connection with eternal, essential
truth; for it was laid open to their understanding;but they faded to comprehend it in its fullness,
and although the living oracles are in our hands, although we have some understanding of the
inspired books of the Old and New Testaments, there is much that even in our day we do not
see and comprehendn (15 November 1892). White's designation of truth as present truth seems
to me a viable option that can help us to move beyond mechanistic and static perceptions of
truth. It may also prevent us from falling into the trap of relativism.
l12SeeC. W. du Toit, "The End of Truth," in New Modes of Thinkingon the Eve of a New
Century: South A f i a Perspectives, 33.
"'Richard R o q maintainsthat ~ietzchehas cadconfusion by moving from "truth is not
a matter of correspondenceto realitynto "what we call 'truths' are just lies." He says that the same
confusion is sometimesfound in Derrida's statement that "there is no re*
as the metaphysicians
have hoped to h d . " Such confusions make Nietz.de and Derrida kable to charges of selfreferentialinconsistency-dumingto know what they themselvesclaim cannot be known ("From
the Contingency of Language," in PostmodemtsmA Readw,ed. PatriciaWaugh b n d o n : Edward
Arnold, 19941, 174).

"'Stanley Hauerwas, "Why the Truth Demands Truthfulness: An Imperious
Engagement with Hart," in Why Narrative? Reddings in Narrative Theology, ed. Stanley
Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 303-310.
l16DuToit, Navorsing en waurhetd?Aanpassingsin die sistematiese teologie in die lig van
veranderde kontekste, 7 .
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It may be a fruitful endeavor to experiment with Groome's wisdom
metaphor instead of the truth metaphor. Groome maintains that wisdom is
more wholistic and historically-grounded concept than cognition and
knowledge. Wisdom refers to our identity and "agencyn in the world.
Therefore, wise people will not only have knowledge of one kind or another,
"but far beyond that, such people are wise in their very being, and this
includes their thoughts, desires, and
The wisdom metaphor seems
to be also more in keeping with the biblical tradition.l18 It may help us to
transcend the limitationsof Western epistemology,because it has included and
moved beyond mere knowledge to an epistemologybased on care rather than
on rational certainty, an epistemology based on solidarity rather than
objecti~it~."~
Instead of relying on rationalism and empiricism to supply scholars with
absolute and objective certainties, faith ensured the certainty of conviction.
Faith, however, was progressively given a rationalistic content, and later
reason was divorced from faith, resulting in a divorce of "reasonable" religion
from experience. Louis Duprk and Jacqueline Mariiia maintain that Kant's
philosophy has introduced the end of reasonable deductions about the
existence of God.120Kant, in Critique of Pure Reason, stated that he "found it
necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith."121

ll*Ibid.,216218. According to Groome, " wisdom's locus was always the kb." Although
this term is often translated as "heart," it in fact refers to the very "core" of a person (Ed10:3).
The kb is the intellectual source of thought and reflection (Isa 6:10), the center of affections (Ps
4 3 , and the seat of volition and conscience (1 Sam 24:5). Thus, biblical wisdom, which is
situated in the kb, pertains to one's head, heart, and hands. In the post-Exilic period, the
emphasis is on wisdom as an ethical response to God's revelation and law. Wisdom is a gh of
God, but it brings responsibility to so live (Job 28). Wise people do God's will, and they
especially promote justice, compassion, and peace (Prov 2). Groome saysthat a focus on wisdom
"would encourage our enterprise to be ontic, to be wholrstic and wholesome, to be humanizing
and life-giving, to be inclusive."
llgRorty maintains that "people seeking for solidarity are seeing the gap between uuth and
justification . . . simply as the gap between the actual good and the possible better. From a
pragmatist point of view, to say that what is rational for us now to believe may not be true,is
simply to say thatsomebody may come up with a better idea. It is to say that there is always room
for improved belief, since new evidence for new hypotheses, or a whole new vocabulary, may
come along. For a prapatkt, the desire for objectivityis not the desireto escape the limitatons of
one's community,but simplythe desirefor asmuch intersubjective agreement as possible, the desire
to errtend the reference of 'us' as far as we can" ("Solidarity or Objectivity," 575).
lZOLouis
Duprk and Jacqueline Mariiia, "The Concept of Faith in Philosophy," in
Handbook of Faith, ed. J. M. Lee (Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press, 1990), 65.
lZ'ImrnanuelKant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1929), 29.

Dzflerentiation Instead of a
Critical Approach
Post-modern scholarship is questioning the modernistic hierarchical
oppositions, interalia of the "surface" and "depth" dimensions of "things."
Dualisms such as subject/object, thought/emotion, scientific/common are
distorted forms of knowledge. Although post-modernity wants to exceed
the conceptual binary oppositions of modernism, it wishes to keep the
products of these myriad reductions and scrutinize the experiential
"continuum" that articulates these opposing points. From a differentiated
point of view these modern binary oppositions of "essence" (depth) and
"appearance" (surface) become adjacent surfaces. In this regard Jacques
Instead of tolerating these oppositions
Derrida's "dzfbance" is he1pf~l.l~~
Derrida focuses on difference, the space between two oppositions. He
wishes "to see what indicates that each of the two terms must appear as the
dzflhance of the other: the one as the difference of the other, deferred or
delayed in the economy of the same contin~um."'~~
This shows the need for
dfferentiation rather than a traditional critical approach.

A Postmodernism Vision: Pointers
Instead of Pillars
J. Wentzel van Huyssteen states that both modernism and
postmodernism have been unable to come to terms with the issue of
rationality. He thus proposes a postfoundationalist position over against the
so-called objectivism of foundationalism and the extreme relativism of
nonfoundationalism. Postfoundationalism wishes to fully acknowledge the
context, the epistemical role of interpreted experience and tradition and its
"shaping of epistemic and non-epistemic values that inform our reflection
about both God and the world." A postfoundational position, however, also
needs to challengerationalism,foundationalism,and progress beyond the local

122See
in this regardJohn D. Caputo, ed.,Deconstruaion in a Nutshel1:A Conversation with
JacquesDwnda (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997),96-105.Degenaar maintainsthat
the "word dzfhance is derived from the term dtfier which means both to differ and to defer,
postpone and delay. . . .It designates three aspects of writing: a 'passive' difference which has
already been made and available to the subject; and [an] act of differing which produces
differences;and an act of deferring which refers to the provisionality of distinctions and to the
fact that the use of language entails the interminable interrelationships in signs." According to
Derrida, "'Dtfhance' is the systematic play of ddferences, of the traces of differences, of the
spacing (espacement) by which elements relate to one another" ("Deconstruction-The
Celebration of Language," 197-198).
I2'Van Niekerk, "Postmodern Theology," 3.
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community and its culture.12' M. Serres argues that beneath a phenomenon
and the information that we have of it, there is an infinite possibility and
multiplicity that cause us to conclude that "what is knowable and what is
known are born of the unknown."lZ5In this regard it is also imperative to take
cognizance of Cilliers' statement, that postmodernism is inherently sensitive
to complexity. He argues that the price we pay for this sensitivity is high in
terms of a conventional approach, because it means abandoning the search for
universal criteria of truth and judgment. This may cause a feeling of loss, but
the nostalgia for absolute criteria has kept us from being involved with our
world in a responsible way.126For conservative theology it will be even harder
to take cognizance of the "chaos theory."12' Thls theory has moved beyond
logical positivism and critical rationalism (to verify or to falsify) and
Newtonian mechanism, and is in search of a new epistemology and a
postcritical philosophy. The chaos theory has demonstrated that things are far
more complex than "Scottish Common Sense Realism" p re tends them to
be.lZ8Newtonian science handled chaos in our world by inserting the order
124VanHuyssteen, 580-581. Whereas in modernism the stereotypical ways of relating
theology and science need to be replaced,Van Huyssteen argues that postmodernist pluralism
makes it almost impossible even to speak about theology, religion, and rationality. Charles
Scriven maintains that the foundational ideas cannot be fully secured beyond question
(Namey Murphy, "Schooling for the Tournament of Narratives: Postmodernism and the
Idea of the Christian College," in Theology without Foundations: Religious Practice and the
Future of Theologtcal Truth, ed. Stanley Hauerwas, Nancey Murphy, and Mark Nation
[Nashville: Abingdon Press, 19941,281).
12'M. Serres, "Noise," Substance 12 (1983) : 54.
126Cilliers
states that in dealing with complex systems we cannot use traditionalanalytical
approaches, because the "nature" of such systems as the human brain, language, and society is
"determined" by many elements that interact in dynamic and nonlinear ways (124).
127JamesGleick, B e Miding of a New Science (New York: Viking, 1987). Three scientists
stand out as the pioneers of chaos theory: Edward Lorenz, Benoit Mandelbrot, and Mitchell
Feigenbaum; see also F. LeRon Shults, "A Theology of Chaos: An Experiment in Postmodern
Theological Science," Scottish Jouml of Theology 45 (1992): 223-235; A. Gerhard van Wyk,
"Methodological Challenges Facing Seventh-day Adventist Theology in the Year 2000: A
Practical-theological Perspective," paper read at the SEDATA Annual Meeting, Helderberg
College, 13 October 1996,l-14.Many of the proponents of the chaos theory claim that it is the
third great scientific revolution of the twentieth century, coming after quantum theory and
Einstein's theory of relativity,which dissolvedthe Newtonian dogma of absolutespace andtime.
The chaostheory has eradicatedLaplace's illusion of deterministicpredictability.Shultssaysthat
while "relativitydescribesthe macroscopic and quantumtheory, the microscopic view of nature,
the theory of chaos appliesto the study of objects on a human scale, to the world we experience
with our senses every day." Chaotic behavior has been discovered in systems such as the orbit
of planas (Pluto), the rhythm of hearts (healthy hearts show sometimes more variability than
sick ones), and the neural activity of the brain.
lZ8Shultsconcludes that although chaos seems to permeate our universe, our theology

and control of God, but where irregularity prevailed led to a "God of the
gaps." Modernistic empirical scientists explained these irregularitieswith their
positivistic approach until frnally they stated with Laplace, "God was no
longer needed." New science has determined, however, that thls world cannot
be explained by its own intrinsic order-our universe is indeed ~ 0 n t i n ~ e n t . l ~ ~
These developments are challenging conservative theologies to replace
the modernistic metaphor of "pillars of truth" and to speak rather of an
episodic "pointer system."130This is not to limit the importance of beliefs,
but to move beyond Newtonian mechanics and to provide it with far
greater potential.

Van Niekerk maintains that the difference between a modernistic and a
post-modern approach can be found in the difference between the conduit
metaphor and the "toolmaker's" paradigm.131He states that in contrast with
the conduit metaphor, in the "toolmaker's" metaphor we have "an immense
workplace filled with tools which serve as units of communicative
transferenceboth between people and between texts and people."1" A reading
scope is constituted between text and context which provides ample tools,
such as cultural signs and pointers, words and concepts, meanings and ideas,
~roductsand ~hysicalphenomena. This entails a complex relationship
between text and reader, but it does not matter, as there can be no success
without effort. It does not aspire to "the correct interpretation," but rather to
can still be a theology of hope. Out of this chaos "God's redemptive order will emerge on
a hlgher level and will ultimately be consumed in the eschatological fulfilment of a new
heaven and a new earth" (233).
lZ9Tracymaintains that postmodernity's attack on the self-confidence of modernity
provided a new opportunity for "serious contemporary thought on God. . . . Indeed,
postmodernitytends to be suspicious of almost all traditional and modern arguments on the
existence of God, all attempts to fit God's reality into a modern horizon of intelligibility, all
of the famous 'isms' for God, from deism and theism through panentheism" (42-43).
' V a n Niekerk, "Postmodern Theology," 3. These pointers may give access to infinite
differentiation, but they are "under construction for the 'duration' of a debate,the 'duration'
of the composition of an essay, the 'duration' of reading a text."
')'For a discussion of the conduit metaphor see van Niekerk, "Postmodern Theology,"
8-9.Although the conduit metaphor made communicationpossible between sendedreceiver
and vice wsa,the one-way traffic stayed in place. Only one correct reading of a text is
possible. See also M. J. Reddy, "The Conduit Metaphor-A Case of Frame Conflict in Our
Language about Language," in Metaphorand i%ought,ed. A. Onony (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986),284-324.
132VanNiekerk, "Postmodern Theology," 13.
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a "good interpretation" for a particular purpose.'33

Conclusion: A N m Vision of Science and
Scholarship as nServanthood"
Modernism opts for a leveling of differences, whereas a post-modern
vision prefers a networking negotiation of differences. The "antagonism
of identity" needs to be replaced by the "agonism of difference."'" The
principle of the negotiation of differences is imperative. Modernistic
discourse privileges a Western rationality, while a post-modern vision
wishes to explore the significance of different lifestyles and perspectives
and thus warns against imperialism.
The modernistic scholar may be regarded as a "divine overseer" in the
sense of the Platonic-divine Theoros. He or she knows what everyone is
believing, thinking, imagining, and feeling. He or she is the "subject" that
knows the "object" in an absolute and objective way. Post-modernists, in
contrast, ask: Should we not rather seek for truth and wisdom as solving
a crossword puzzle instead of problem-solving in terms of a critical
rationalistic approach?'3sThe post-modern scholar can be regarded as one
who is a participant in seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, and doing with
others of his or her society while negotiating, confronting, fragmenting,
linking, and accommodating other discourses episodically.'36This seems
to indicate that within a post-modern paradigm the role and task of the
scholar are going to change radically.
Instead of being informers about objective facts, post-modernists hope
that scholars will become more like servants, more like listeners. They
will overcome the dichotomy that Kant forged between practical and
theoretical reason and consequently between ethics and science. Scholars
will become conscious about the political power of knowledge. The
binary oppositions such as male/female, mindbody, subject/object,
thought/emotion, scientific/common, husk/kernel are hierarchically
positioned, favoring the former over the latter. These distorted forms of
knowledge can be destructive for all, even for those in power.
Post-modernists envision that the relations between scholars,
students, and laypeople will change. Their goal is to have less a knowing
13'Degenaar, 7he Collapse of Unity, 19. Antagonism forces one to conquer, while
agonism wishes to accept, challenge, and accommodate others' differing perspectives.
'j5SeeNancey Murphy, "Truth,Relativism, and Crossword Puzzles,"Zygon 24 (1989):
299-314.
''Wan Niekerk, "Lnaugural Lecture," 38.

scholar informing others, but one who will interact in mutual exploration
of relevant issues. Authority will then shift from an external to a
communal and dialogue sphere. This movement will focus more on the
process and on emerging patterns than on the course run, without
splitting this process nor the course in a dichotomous way. Within the
machine-orientatedparadigm the scholar was the driver and the students
the audience, at best. At worst, the passengers are the objects being driven.
The students or "priesthood of believers" cannot be removed from a
meaningful interaction with the scholar.
Post-modernists envision that scholars will become people who are
listening to the experience of the total ecosystem, its wonder, its silence, its
voices, its songs, its hopes, its pains, its visions, and missions. The scholar as
servant will not in the first instance focus on dualistic and mechanistic rules
and regulations to make absolute statements. Scholars will be guided by an
epistemology based on an ethic of care and will construct knowledge that
is humanizing and able to touch every aspect of people's lives.

